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《Abstract》
In contrast to earlier market-oriented Korean FDIs in India, the POSCO-
India project has been embroiled in legal and procedural quagmires and 
protests from many anti-POSCO groups. Indeed, the project has been one 
of the most controversial issues in the state, and it has generated a lot of 
protest. The project ran into trouble from the outset. Villagers were 
opposed to the acquisition of their land on a fertile strip on the coast of the 
Bay of Bengal near Paradip, which is famous for its betel vines. Their 
resistance was largely because the betel-based economy sustained 20,000-
odd people in eight villages in Dhinkia, Nuagaon and Gadakujanga gram 
panchayats, which stood to be affected by the project. The villagers, who 
gathered under the banner of the POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti (PPSS) 
to protest the acquisition of their land, rejected the state government’s 
rehabilitation package. POSCO suspended its project in July 2015 and later 
decided to temporarily freeze the project in 2016. POSCO confirmed its 
withdrawal from the project by requesting the Odisha government to take 
back the land on March 18. So, why did the POSCO-India project fail in 
Odisha? Why did POSCO decide to invest in India and why did the Odisha 
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government welcome it? What was the origin of the protest against the 
project, and what was being asked for? The main reasons for the delay and 
defeat of the project were the failure to build a local political consensus on 
the project, disputes about government records of the land, and 
compensation. There were especially strong protests against the project 
from the prospective displaced persons. Compulsory displacements due to 
the project unleashed widespread social, economic and environmental 
changes. Forced displacement epitomizes the social exclusion of certain 
groups of people. With this background, I examine the failure of the 
POSCO-India project, the industrial development path and the project-
affected persons (PAPs) discontent in Odisha, and I conclude that the “Land 
War” in Odisha may not stop for some time.  
Ⅰ. Introduction
Faced with a severe balance of payments crisis as foreign exchange 
reserves plummeted to US $1 billion in late June 1991, India entered into an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program. In 
addition to the conventional expenditure switching and reducing policies, as 
part of the IMF agreement, India enacted a range of far-reaching economic 
policy reforms – the New Industrial Policy (NIP)- in July 1991 in the 
external, industrial, financial and public sectors. A major shift occurred 
when India embarked upon this economic liberalization and reform program 
to raise its growth potential and integrating with the world economy (Park 
1991).
Generally, economic engagement with another country involving goods 
productions goes through the three phases extensive to intensive 
production and trade, beginning with labor-intensive manufactured export 
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trade, moving onto financial and technological collaboration, to foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The last entails ownership of productive assets 
abroad. Korea’s partnership with India has more or less followed this path, 
especially with the economic reforms of 1991. Korean companies have 
stepped up FDI in India and formed joint ventures with Indian companies or 
made greenfield investment in automobiles, consumer goods and other 
sectors (Park 2005). With a growing population of over 1.2 billion and a 
rising Indian middle class (D’Costa 2005), India offers investors a huge 
domestic market to exploit, especially as Korea’s domestic market is 
beginning to dry up.  
In this paper, I examine Pohang Iron and Steel Company’s (POSCO) 
involvement in India, particularly in the mineral-rich eastern state of 
Odisha. Economic liberalization in India has made Odisha potentially the 
most attractive destination for large, capital intensive, mineral-based 
projects by private sector firms (Mishra 2010, 49). POSCO signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) on June 22, 2005 with the 
Government of Odisha to set up an integrated steel plant and a captive port 
in the Ersama Block of Jagatsinghpur District, Odisha. POSCO has plans to 
invest about US$12 billion to produce 12 million tonnes of steel per year, 
potentially the single-largest FDI in India.
Aside from offering another case of Korean heavy-industry business 
expansion in Asia, POSCO’s intended venture in India has been highly 
controversial. It raises ethical dilemmas surrounding large-scale acquisition 
of land that dispossesses and displaces large number of people whose 
livelihoods are at stake. In contrast to other market-seeking FDI in India, 
the POSCO-India project has been highly contested, generating a lot of 
protest. 
However, POSCO is not alone. Other similar mineral-based projects 
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including those by Tata, and Vedanta also faced opposition. Also in Orissa, 
indigenous cultivators were opposing the transfer of their sacred Niyamgiri 
Hill to London-based Vedanta to mine bauxite for its aluminum smelter, 
while in Kalinga Nagar police fired upon farmers who refused to relinquish 
land for a Tata Steel plant, killing fourteen people. (Mishra, I. 2007; 
Mishra, S.K. 2006; Padhi and Adev 2006). Outside of Mumbai, farmers 
along Maharashtra’s Konkan coast fought and eventually defeated the land 
acquisition for Reliance Industries’ Maha Mumbai Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ), slated to be the largest in the country. Outside of Gurgaon in 
Haryana, Reliance’s other mega-SEZ was losing a slow war of attrition. 
(Levien 2013, 3) A struggle pre-dating Nandigram in the villages of Singur, 
West Bengal, eventually succeeded in shutting down a Tata car factory that 
planned to manufacture the much-hyped “Nano.”(Fernandes 2007; 
Banerjee et al. 2007, Bhadra and Ray 2007; Bhattacharya 2007; Patnaik 
2007; Levien 2013, 3).
In Uttar Pradesh, farmers were fighting land acquisition for the 
privately-built Yamuna Expressway, which entailed large transfers of land 
to private builders, and successfully challenged land acquisition for 
residential development around Greater Noida. SEZs were being held up 
near Mangalore, Hyderabad, along the Andhra Pradesh coast, and across 
Maharasthra. Many were being scrapped, including two outside of Pune, 
and all of the SEZs proposed for the state of Goa. Others were bogged 
down in costly delays and had to seek extensions of their approval 
(Business Standard 2009, cited from Levien 2013, 2). Even in Gujarat, 
often heralded as the most successful state in facilitating land acquisition for 
industry, the press reported in 2009 that, due to land acquisition problems, 
no work had commenced on fifteen approved SEZs. Added to all of this, 
India was facing a growing Maoist insurgency that now controlled large 
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swathes of mineral-rich territory from Andhra Pradesh to Nepal, and 
which, by the government’s own admission, was clearly being fuelled by 
land dispossession for mining and industry (Government of India 2008, 50 
cited from Levien 2013, 3). What is more important is that these protests 
are not necessarily anti-industrialization, but rather are driven by strong 
environmental and moral concerns (Temper and Martinez-Alier 2007).
In sum, what came to be known as “land wars” were not only becoming 
much more widespread, but farmers were, in an unprecedented fashion, 
starting to win. By the late 2000s, land acquisition had become, in Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh’s words, “a very sensitive issue”, and the 
government and business classes voiced acute concern that farmers were 
becoming the largest obstacle to India’s emergence as a “world class” 
economic power (cited from Levien 2013, 3). 
When the Odisha government signed the memorandum of understanding 
with POSCO, it made a commitment to the company to offer 4,004 acres of 
coastal land, even though the Industrial Development Corporation Odisha 
(IDCO) did not have a single acre at its disposal unlike its counterpart in 
Gujarat that keeps a land bank ready before inviting any prospective 
investor to the state (Mishra 2014, 1-5). The project ran into trouble from 
the onset. Villagers opposed the acquisition of their land – on a fertile strip 
on the coast of the Bay of Bengal near Paradip, famous for its betel vines. 
The resistance was largely because the betel-based economy sustained 
20,000-odd people in eight villages in Dhinkia, Nuagaon and Gadakujanga 
gram panchayats that would be affected by the project. And about 3,566 
acres of the 4,004 acres of land required for the steel plant was to come 
from forestland, its sandy landscape dotted with around 5,000 betel vines 
(Park 2011). 
The Jagatsinghpur district administration countered the resistance by 
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accusing the villagers of occupying the forestland illegally, though the 
latter said they had been cultivating betel for generations. The villagers, 
who came under the banner of the POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti 
(PPSS) to protest the land acquisition, rejected the state government’s 
rehabilitation package. While the IDCO handed over 1,700 acres out of the 
total 2,700 acres to POSCO, to start an 8-million-tonne-capacity steel mill 
in the first phase, still, not a brick was laid in the project area. There were 
several reasons for this. The main objectives of POSCO-India project were 
to secure raw material and penetrate the Indian steel market. POSCO had 
launched the project in India to build an integrated steel plant. Locating a 
plant close to raw materials source is a cost reducing strategy, especially 
when freight costs are on the rise. It is a representative type of resource 
seeking FDI. Though the steel plant was central to the project, it had two 
other vital components – a port and a mine. POSCO’s stand on getting the 
captive mine and port was driven by its intention to source iron ore from 
the Khadadhar hill in Sundargarh district at cheap rates. However, in 
January 2015, an amendment of the Mine and Minerals Development and 
Regulation Act – in the wake of allegations of mining scams across the 
country, including in Odisha – put a spanner in POSCO’s plans. Under the 
amended law, it was now mandatory for the company to go through the 
auction route to get its captive iron ore mine (Sahu 2017). 
POSCO had suspended its project in July 2015 and again later by deciding 
to temporarily freeze the project in 2016. POSCO confirmed the withdrawal 
of its project by requesting the Odisha government to take back the land 
transferred in its name, according to a statement by Odisha’s industry 
minister Devi Prasad Mishra made on March 18, 2017. (Mahapatra 2017). 
Giving up the land essential for building a steel mill means POSCO has 
finally decided to abandon the Odisha project, which has been delayed for 
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12 years. 
In this paper, I try to address a few questions, such as, why the POSCO-
India had failed in Odisha? why did the POSCO decide to invest in India and 
why did the Odisha government welcome the project? What is the origin of 
protest against the project and what are the demands? How are those 
affected to be compensated and how is resettlement and rehabilitation of 
these displaced people being approached? 
To address these questions, I examine the background of POSCO’s 
investment, India’s industrial development path, and the discontent 
expressed by the “project affected persons” (PAP) in Odisha. I also suggest 
a desirable approach to land acquisition that rests on trust, moral economy 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The paper is organized as 
follows. In section Ⅱ, I analyze the background of POSCO investment in 
India. This is followed by a review of industrialization strategy for poverty 
alleviation and sustainable development in Odisha. In Section Ⅲ, I analyze 
the people’s discontent with the POSCO project. The political economy of 
land acquisition in India and the impoverishment risks and reconstruction 
(IRR) model based on moral economy are examined in Section Ⅳ. The last 
section, briefly offers some implication for FDI engaged in the extractive 
and energy sectors in developing countries.
Ⅱ. Background of POSCO’s Investment in India
1. International Expansion and Market Competition
During the late-industrialization process in South Korea, the steel 
industry was a one of the major “generative sectors” in the capitalist world 
economy (Shin and Ciccantell 2009, 171). The Korean government 
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established POSCO in 1968, and the company received extensive 
government support from the beginning. Since then, POSCO has 
aggressively led technological advance and business expansion both inside 
and outside Korea. In the 1990s POSCO completed its Pohang Works 
project and further expanded its capacity by completing its Kwangyang 
Works project, increasing its steel production capability to 28 metric 
tonnes per year (MTPY) (POSCO annual report 2010). POSCO was able to 
build its production capability and technology to compete in the 
international settings. Based on “state autonomy, indigenous technological 
capability and competitive industrial policy”, POSCO could maintain the 
“structural competitiveness” in the steel industry (D’Costa 1994, 1999).
The 2000s were years of international expansion for POSCO. 
Recognizing the importance of securing the raw materials and increasing 
competition from outside country, POSCO had to expand its business 
outside Korea. The steel industry is considered a logistics industry because 
of high transportation cost of steel rolls. Furthermore, lots of heavy 
materials are required to produce steel. Therefore, the steel industry must 
establish regional manufacturing facility where it produces steel that meets 
regional demands and be able to provide with minimum logistics cost. 
POSCO has been working to establish such regional networks over the past 
few decades (POSCO annual report 2010).
In addition to the high cost of logistics, there are several reasons that 
POSCO needs to expand internationally. Prime end-user industries for steel 
are automakers, shipbuilders, construction and engineering, and machinery 
industries. In a given country, there are always limiting demands for the 
steel products because steel demand is a derived demand. Furthermore, 
traditional steel buyers in Korea - automakers - are expanding their 
production facilities overseas. Hyundai Motor group has established 
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production facilities all over the world. Given the economic maturity of the 
Korean economy, which has resulted in decreasing steel consumption, 
POSCO has been compelled to find new markets. In response, POSCO has 
pursued a new strategy, expanding its business by reaching out to 
international markets where demand growth is high. 
POSCO has been making efforts to develop export markets for high 
value-added steel products. Thus, POSCO needs to find new customers to 
purchase its steel products for automobile manufacturing and as a result, 
POSCO has established many steel processing centers abroad especially in 
Asian countries (POSCO annual report 2010). Since the privatization in 
2000, POSCO has invested in high return projects in the downstream 
process as well as try to match the development of the Korean automobile 
and electronics industries. 
The Korean government had tried to keep the monopoly of POSCO in the 
upstream process in the 1990s through the license system. The Hyundai 
group announced installation of a new integrated works in 1995. The 
government decided not to accept Hyundai’s plan or any other plan to build 
a new integrated steel plant with blast furnaces, fearing excess capacity. 
However, the market structure had totally changed since the economic 
crisis in 1997. First, the Hyundai Motor group enhanced its presence 
significantly in the steel industry. The group started buying bankrupted 
steel makers. Inchon Steel, a firm that belongs to the group, absorbed 
Kangwon Industries in 2000, and took over Sammi Special Steel and altered 
its name to BNG Steel. Inchon Steel as such became INI steel in 2001 (now 
Hyundai Steel) and in 2004 INI Steel bought the Dangjin plant of Hanbo 
Iron and Steel. Second, POSCO was completely privatized in 2000 (Lim 
2003, 52-5, cited from Sato 2009, 19). 
This has created intense competition in the flat product markets among 
The POSCO-India Project and the Land War in Odisha
296
existing mini-mills and rolling companies and they too began to invest in 
new facilities, with the involvement of conglomerates (Sato 2009:19). 
Hyundai Steel has recently increased its annual crude steel production 
capacity from 15mn tonnes to 19 mn tonnes (11 mn tonnes using electric 
arc furnace and 8mn tonnes using basic oxygen furnace technology) with 
the beginning of steel production from its second blast furnace in December 
2010(Credit Suisse 2011). As Hyundai Steel increase her market share in 
Korea, the monopolistic status of POSCO is on the decline. The 
downstream steel market in Korea is mainly led by POSCO and Hyundai 
Steel as shown in the <Figure 2-1>.
2. Procurement of Iron Ore and Market Seeking in India
Having already completed its industrial transition and become a mature 
<Figure 2-1> Structure of steel industry in Korea
Source: Author’s collation based on data. 
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economy, Korea must find new sources of capital accumulation. Through 
innovation and upgrading, it is already engaged in maintaining its growth 
dynamic. However, in mature sectors in which it has been successful, such 
as the steel industry, POSCO is trying to maintain its viability through 
internationalization, in steel exports to the world economy, in production 
(as in Vietnam) but also by securing raw materials for new markets such as 
India and others. 
The main objectives of POSCO-India project are to secure raw material 
and penetrate the Indian steel market. It has identified India as a priority 
market its huge domestic demand. More importantly, India is also well-
endowed with iron ore. POSCO has launched a steel project in India to 
build an integrated steel plant. Locating a plant close to raw materials 
source is a cost reducing strategy, especially when freight costs are on the 
rise. It is a representative type of resource seeking FDI.1） It has market-
seeking motives as well. POSCO’s choice of Odisha as the stepping stone 
for its largest single-location India project was influenced by two factors: 
the state's rich iron ore deposits and its coastline. Around 35 per cent of 
India's iron ore deposits are in Odisha, but only a fraction of it is mined, and 
an even smaller fraction utilized locally. Odisha's long coastline facilitates 
shipments to locations globally (Balasubramanyam 2011). 
As shown in the <Table 2-1> and <Table 2-2>, POSCO’s original plan 
was to set up upstream projects (steel mills) in eastern India where raw 
material is available, and downstream plants (product factories) in western 
India where industries are based. POSCO expanded its reach in India 
The POSCO-India Project and the Land War in Odisha
1) Following Dunning (1993, 1998), one of the motive for a firm to actually engage in FDI 
activity can go under the heading of resource seeking. As Dunning (1993:56) himself puts it, 
this should include all the cases where enterprises are “prompted to invest abroad to acquire 
particular and specific resources at a lower real cost than could be obtained in their home 
country.” 
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POSCO had opened new steel processing centers in Karnataka, Madhya 
Pradesh and Gujarat after starting five such centers and a manufacturing 
unit as it expands in India. The Indian market has great potential for 
automotive materials. That is why POSCO has been investing in this 
segment through processing centers, a galvanizing unit, and an electrical 
through the steel processing center. POSCO Maharashtra, is implementing 
the three downstream projects. The electrical steel sheet plant at Raigad as 
well as POSCO’s coil processing units already operating at Pune, Gurgaon 
and Chennai, produces steel used in home appliances, automobile and 
power stations (Balasubramanyam 2011). 
<Table 2-1> upstream of the POSCO–India project and locations
Project Locations Land
Steel plant Nuagaon, Dhinkia, Gadakujanga 4,004 acres, of which 3,566 are classified as 
forest land
Captive port Mouth of river Jatadhar no clear territorial demarcation
Mines Khandadhar Hills (Keonjhar and 
Sundergerh districts)
2,500 hectares Khandadhar Hills (no clear 
territorial demarcation)
Township At steel plant and at mines land not yet earmarked
Source: Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group (2010, 6) with author’s modification
<Table 2-2> POSCO’s downstream supply chain management in India (2012)
POSCO-IDPC POSCO-IPPC POSCO-ICPC POS-Hyundai
Location Delhi Pune, Hyderabad Chennai Chennai
Partnership POSCO, Samsung,
Shinhan Bank
POSCO, LG POSCO POSCO, POSTEEL,
 Hyundai
Major market
demand
Maruti, LG Tata, Fiat, LG,
  Crompton, JCB
Hyundai Motors, 
Ford
Hyundai Motors, 
Ford
Source: Author’s collation based on data 
Notes: POSCO-IDPC: POSCO-India Delhi Steel Processing Centre; POSCO-IPPC: POSCO India 
Pune Steel Processing Centre; POSCO-ICPC: POSCO India Chennai Steel Processing Centre; 
POS-Hyundai: Joint Venture Company Promoted by three Korean Multinationals, Hyundai 
Corporation, POSCO and POSCO Steel Service and Sales Company (POSTEEL)
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steel unit. By introducing the latest blanking line equipment for automotive 
steel processing centers, POSCO is increasing its capacity to meet just-in-
time (JIT) customer demand (POSCO annual report 2010). As shown in the 
<Table 2-2>, POSCO’s processing plants are near Delhi, Hyderabad and 
Chennai all of which are part of POSCO Korea’s marketing arm. 
3.  National Mineral Policy and Industrialization Strategy of Odisha 
The new industrial policy in India opened up the iron and steel sector for 
private investment by removing it from the list of industries reserved for 
the public sector and exempting it from compulsory licensing. Imports of 
foreign technology as well as foreign direct investment are freely permitted 
up to certain limits under an automatic route. The Union Ministry of Steel 
plays the role of facilitator, providing broad directions and assistance to 
new and existing steel plants in the liberalized scenario. 
One of the key developments in the mineral sector in the wake of 
economic reforms in India was the New Mineral Policy of 1993 and the 
amendments to the Mines and minerals Act 1957, which brought about the 
deregulation of the mining sector by allowing 50 % investment by foreign 
companies in mining and opening all non-atomic and non-mining minerals to 
private investment.2) Another important trend in the sector following the 
amendments in the Mining Act and Policy has been the widespread growth 
of small-scale iron ore exporters. The current export policy for raw 
materials like iron ore was formulated under the 2004 Foreign Trade Policy 
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2) In December 1999, the Act was renamed the Mines and Minerals Development and 
Regulation Act, with further changes including: 1) Introducing a provision for reconnaissance 
permits, 2) Raising the cap on foreign direct investment to 100% in February 2000, 3) Giving 
the states the right to grant leases for exploiting 15 minerals with the other major minerals 
still remaining in the hands of the central government (Government of India 2009). 
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(Asher 2009).
The Planning Commission under the UPA government set up a high-level 
committee to review India’s mineral policy and suggest further policy 
changes needed “to attract more foreign and domestic investment in the 
mineral exploration sector”. The committee under the chairperson Anwarul 
Hoda is expected to give a ‘new direction’ to the India's mining sector.3) 
With the rising metal prices and deregulation, mineral-rich state Odisha 
started aggressively attracting both domestic and foreign investment into 
this crucial sector. Odisha had only two iron and steel plants until 1995. 
Growth in the iron and steel sector remained marginal in the 1995-2000, 
but saw a rapid spurt in the post-2000 period. By November 2005, the BJD-
led government in Odisha had signed 43 MoUs in the iron and steel sector. 
Of these, six (including POSCO-India) were mega steel projects, all above 3 
MTPA capacity as shown in <Table 2-3>. 
Given its agro-climatic conditions, natural resources endowments, and 
long coastal line, Odisha is often cited as a case of unfulfilled potential for 
both agricultural and industrial growth (Government of Odisha 2004, 227). 
The most striking observation one can make about Odisha is that while it is 
rich in resources, the people are poor. The existence of significant iron ore, 
3) Emphasizing the criticality of FDI in this sector the committee report suggests as follows; “In 
view of the paramount need to take a quantum leap in steel capacity and per capita steel 
consumption and keeping in mind domestic financial and technology ground realities, there 
should be no barrier for one or two large foreign entities with a proven track record and 
access to global finance and cutting edge technology to enter the Indian steel scenario... 
Such entry would bring in its wake multiplier benefits of latest construction and operating 
technologies in raw material processing and steel making on the one hand and on the other, 
lead to deeper integration of Indian steel with the world market place. Such entry should, 
however, be limited to only a few large scale projects of, say, minimum 10 MTPA (million ton 
per annum) which can be considered of national importance, in order to make a quantum 
jump in steel production in quantity and quality” ( http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/
genrep/rep_nmp.pdf). 
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coal, bauxite and among other resources in Odisha held out to its political 
leaders the promise of rapid industrialization through natural resource 
extraction (Kale 2007, 81). With the change of power from Congress to 
non-Congress parties in the 1990s, there was a growing realization among 
the political class in Odisha. The 1990s brought a radical break with 
previous policy, opening up industrial sectors to both indigenous and 
multinational capital (Kale 2007, 94-5). 
For Adduci (2012), the privatization process of mineral resources appears 
to be a crucial arena for the reproduction of longstanding relations of social 
dominance in Odisha. By embracing the neoliberal project this social class 
has expanded its own role of facilitating capital through its cheap access to 
the raw materials of Odisha. At the same time, within the neoliberal tern of 
capitalism, new space for the social reproduction of the Odisha neo-rentier 
class continues to be created (Adduci 2012, 93).  
Since 1993, the privatization process in the Odisha mineral sector has 
been encouraged by the local government. For the first time since 
Independence the exploitation of two of the four major minerals present in 
state territory - chromite and iron ore - was fully opened up to the private 
sector (Adduci 2012, 77-8). Of the 162 mining leases granted in Odisha 
< Table 2-3 > List of mega-steel plant project in Odisha (as on Nov. 2005)
Company Location
Capacity
(million ton 
per annual.)
Investment
(crore Rs.) Year of MoU
Tata Iron and Steel Kalinganagar,Duburi,Jajpur 6.0 15,400 2004
Sterlite Iron and Steel Palasponga, Keonjhar 5.1 12,502 2004
Hygrade Pellets Paradeep 4.0 10,721 2005
POSCO-India Paradeep 12.0 51,000 2005
Jindal Steel and Power Deojhar,Keonjhar,Angul 6.0 13,135 2005
Bhushan Steel and Strips Meramundali, Dhenkanal 3.0 5,828 2005
Total 36.1 108,586
Source: Park ( 2011).
The POSCO-India Project and the Land War in Odisha
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since Independence for the exploitation of chromite, iron ore and bauxite, 
nearly one third have been granted since the start of liberalization and 80% 
of these were granted to private players (Government of India 2009; 
Government of Odisha 2005). The overall number of mining leases granted 
post 1993 for iron ore extraction constitute close to 70 % of the total 
number of leases granted after liberalization (Government of India 2009). 
As shown in <Table 2-4>, within ten years of India’s opening up to 
liberalization mineral production increased by 100% and in following years 
it continued to soar (Adduci 2012, 79). 
The Odisha government notified its new industrial policy in March 2007. 
In order to attract investors, the policy created a framework of governance 
structures with the sole purpose of speedy and easy establishment of 
industrial projects (Asher 2009). In this development path, Odisha 
(in million tonnes) 
Year production % increase in productionover previous year
1991/92 37.20 19.73 %
1992/93 39.86 7.15 %
1993/94 40.58 1.81 %
994/95 43.86 8.08 %
1995/96 51.12 16.55 %
1996/97 56.91 11.33 %
1997/98 62.81 10.37%
1998/99 63.43 0.99 %
1999/2000 64.49 1.66 %
2000/01 68.92 6.88 %
2001/02 74.98 8.79 %
2002/03 87.36 16.51 %
2003/04 108.01 23.95 %
2004/05 127.05 17.64 %
2005/06 139.68 9.94 %
Source: Government of Odisha (2007) cited from Adduci (2012)
<Table 2-4> Growth in Mineral Production in Odisha since Liberalization
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government has welcomed POSCO investment expecting the project will 
open new employment opportunities and also contribute to poverty 
alleviation (Park 2011).
Ⅲ. Local Response and Reflections on POSCO-India Project
1. Different views on the POSCO-India project
In my earlier work (Park 2011), I identified the main reasons for the 
delay in the project; the failure to build local political consensus on the 
project, disputes over Government record on the land, and compensation. 
It is important to recognize the difference between market-seeking FDI and 
resource-seeking FDI, such as the POSCO-India project. The project and 
its three interlinked but distinct components - the captive port, steel plant 
and mines - have faced separate hurdles at every point. There has been 
strong protest against the project from the prospective displaced persons. 
Forced displacement epitomizes social exclusion of certain groups of people 
from a specific geographic territory and reinforces economic and social 
exclusion from existing social networks (Cernea 2000; Downing 2002). 
The controversy surrounding the POSCO-India project has clearly 
emerged as a struggle around material issues of livelihood and the 
economic future of local communities in coastal Jagatsinghpur and the 
Khandadhar hills of Keonjhar and Sundergerh. The people of local 
community clearly see the agrarian economy as one that assures them a 
future. However, the government of Odisha claims that the POSCO-India 
project, among others, is a crucial part of the economic advancement of the 
State. (Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group 2010, 29)
Initially the opposition to the POSCO project was widespread in all the 
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eight villages where it was supposed to be sited. Subsequently, a number of 
the villages, except one, changed their opinion. The villagers are almost 
equally divided between supporters of the POSCO project and opponents of 
the project. One village, Dhinkia, however, has remained steadfastly 
opposed to the project; so much so that the villagers drove out of the 
village the few families that were favorably inclined towards the project 
(Government of India 2010, 6). The hostility has reached levels where 
violent assaults among the villagers have taken place, as well as 
confrontation with the police, resulting in grievous injuries and even in 
death (Government of India 2010, 6).
A primary axes along which the comparison of the different views on the 
POSCO-India project can be labelled “current livelihood vs promised 
livelihood”. The current local economy yields incomes to different classes 
of people differentially: those who own land vs. those who do not have land, 
those  involved in betel vine culture vs those involved in pisciculture, and 
so forth (Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group 2010, 29). 
Along with these mega projects, open pit coal mining result in large land 
acquisition–mainly agricultural lands for mining operations. These projects 
were executed in resource-rich regions, which have been occupied by tribal 
and rural poor. Although these development projects have brought manifold 
benefits to the state, they have resulted in large-scale deforestation, not 
only for raw material exploitation, but also for acquisition of vast areas of 
land under cultivation for the establishment of factories, reservoirs and so 
on. The unintended consequence of such action has not only meant loss of 
habitat for the rural tribal poor, but also of their means of livelihood, which 
had been mainly agriculture, and utilization and sale of forest products. The 
groups displaced have been mostly the weaker sections of the society, 
indigenous people belonging to Scheduled castes (SC), Scheduled tribes 
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(ST) and Other backward classes (OBCs). At the root of these problems is 
an entirely different world view of natural resources. Governments and 
companies have one perspective, whereas indigenous peoples and some 
local communities have another. The former consider the natural resource, 
a means of generating wealth, while indigenous peoples have multiple 
relationships, including economic, spiritual, cultural, and in some cases 
kinship, to the same lands, lands that are fundamental to their identity, 
survival, well-being, and security (World Bank Group and Extractive 
Industries 2003, vol. 2, 47). 
The indigenous peoples have continuously maintained that their rights 
have not been respected in extractive industries projects supported by their 
state government. The question of control over land and resources has 
surfaced as one of the most contentious issues and has created a legacy of 
distrust, impoverishment, violence, and conflict, often ending in gross 
human rights violations and even bloodshed as shown in Kashipur, Kalinga 
Nagar, Singur and Nandigram (Park 2011; World Bank Group and 
Extractive Industries 2003, vol. 2, 47). 
2. Fear of dearth and strong resistance against the eviction 
Why is the resistance to POSCO-India project so strong? In 
Jagatsinghpur, Odisha, of the 4,004 acres required for the POSCO-India 
steel plant site of the project area, only 438 acres are private land. The rest 
is government land, recorded as “under forest” or “anabadi”. The fertile 
anabadi land is under the possession of the local people for ages as it is 
suitable for the growth of betel leaf (pann). More than 15,000 pann baraj 
(betel leaf farm) are on Government land. Government records do not show 
that most of this land has been under betel, cashew and other cultivation for 
generations. The last settlement record was prepared in 1984. It 
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recognizes only claims on agricultural lands under regular occupation. In 
absence of regularization of their legal titles on such lands, these “illegal 
occupants” and “encroachers” have been consistently and systematically 
displaced and evicted in the name of development projects, most without 
any rights to rehabilitation. Other uses such as grazing, collection of 
firewood, forest produce and cashew cultivation or even fishing are 
unrecorded. These are livelihood activities that account for the subsistence 
of a large number of families in the area. Yet the records show the land as 
belonging to the government. That is why resistance to POSCO-India is so 
strong (Asher 2009, 13-16). 
For Scott (1976), “the position of them is like a man standing 
permanently up to the neck in the water, so that even a ripple might drown 
him.” (Scott 1976, ⅶ ). “Fear of the dearth” explains many otherwise 
anomalous technical, social, and moral arrangement in peasant society 
(Scott 1976, ⅶ ). The fact that “subsistence-oriented peasants” typically 
prefer to avoid economic disaster rather than to maximize their average 
income has enormous implication for the solution of the land problems. To 
find out the underlying factor of PAPs’ protests against the POSCO, one 
should understand the “moral content of subsistence ethics” of rural 
Odisha. For these people, eviction from the land or forest is a total loss of 
traditional means of subsistence (Scott 1976). 
Restriction of forest use is one of the galling to peasants. As Scott (1976, 
63-4) notes, “If the resources that had always been as free as the air they 
breathed and that remained close at hand were suddenly denied them they 
could not bear it and struggle against the eviction.” Especially in the 
backward areas such as Odisha, subsistence-oriented peasants “resort to 
more violent outbursts and revolutionary solution” (Sathe 2011, 153). As 
Basu (2007, 1283) has underlined, “the peasant had a holistic culture that 
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directly opposed the commodity culture of globalization. Loss of land will 
deprive the peasants of the opportunity to work, which is the realization of 
human existence, even if they can earn sufficient interest income from the 
monetary compensation without doing any work.” People get adequate 
sustainable resources including food materials from the land and forest. 
They do not see any bright future for them if the region is industrialized at 
the cost of losing their traditional means of subsistence (Meher 2009, 462). 
3. Reflections on POSCO
POSCO has been in Odisha since 2005. POSCO started exerting pressure 
on the state to acquire land quickly. As the discussions became 
protracted, private rent-seeking agents and intermediaries including some 
political organizations have gotten involved in the process. Meanwhile, the 
locals are also organize themselves, or are induced to align either with local 
political groups such as PPSS (POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti), Bhita 
Mati Bachao Andolan(BMBA) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
resist the intended investment by POSCO.4) With time, the communication 
gap and distance between the positions held by both sides increases. As the 
situation becomes difficult, the blame game starts. Violent clashes have 
occurred between the “pro-POSCO” and “anti-POSCO” faction. This leads 
to huge opportunity costs for both sides (Kakani, et al. 2009, 137).
The project has split coastal communities in Odisha. About 52 families of 
Abhayachandpur hamlet of village of Dhinkia who had openly supported the 
project were forcefully driven out by the villagers of Dhinkia and PPSS. 
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4) Loosely translated, PPPS is an anti-POSCO organization aimed to protect human rights, 
livelihoods, and the environment affected by the POSCO project and BMBA is a movement to 
save the people dependent on the POSCO-affected land. 
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Administration asked POSCO to immediately initiate a transit house and 
keep them with support from project. POSCO relocated them at the 
“Transit Camp” with make shift arrangements near Balitutha. As 
Mishra(2014) noted, “that was an opportunity for POSCO to show in action 
how an international and foreign company can support as an exemplary 
activity, but here POSCO did not show any exemplary support” (Mishra 
2014, 31).
Since leaving their villages and resettling in the Transit Camp, these 
villagers have suffered clear and dramatic declines in their enjoyment of a 
number of rights, including but not limited to their rights to housing, food, 
water, health, education, and work. Transit Camp residents live in cramped 
and sweltering one-room homes with roofs containing asbestos. These 
accommodations fail to protect residents from both heat and rain and pose 
serious health risks. While they previously enjoyed access to abundant, 
clean water in their villages, residents now share one tubewell and 
complain of irritation to the throat and skin upon contact with the water. 
The sanitary facilities are limited and in poor condition, and women and 
girls lack privacy when using these facilities for bathing (International 
Human Rights Clinic, ESCR-Net 2013, 6). According to an official 
investigation of the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights 
(NCPCR), Indian authorities have failed to ensure Transit Camp residents’ 
access to essential health, education, and child welfare services, which has 
had an acute impact on young children and girls residing in the camp (cited 
from International Human Rights Clinic, ESCR-Net 2013, 6). 
Relocation to the Transit Camp - which is located far from work 
opportunities or land on which to farm - has impoverished residents and 
pushed previously self-sufficient families into economic dependence. 
Without sufficient employment opportunities they are forced to rely on a 
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daily allowance provided by POSCO, Rs. 20 per person, an amount that is 
grossly insufficient to meet their needs and the needs of their families 
(International Human Rights Clinic, ESCR-Net 2013, 6).
As Mishra (2014, 31-2) states, “ The people by and large in the locality 
started disbelieving the commitments of POSCO that they will ensure the 
project affected people a better live for tomorrow. It is a fact that POSCO 
rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) team was not well equipped nor 
government RR initiatives are properly executed. Hence the grievance 
redress mechanism, which should have been very vibrant at Paradip to bait 
the mind set up of the people, was conspicuous by its absence.” 5)
As Balaton-Chrimes(2015) notes, “POSCO and the Government of 
Odisha have failed to provide timely, accurate and comprehensive 
information to those who are going to be affected by the POSCO project, 
and this has negatively affected the communities’ ability to express 
grievances and concerns regarding POSCO’s current and proposed 
activities in two key ways. Firstly, publicly available information about the 
project is dominated by studies produced by POSCO or bodies funded by 
POSCO, which constitutes a conflict of interest. Secondly, there is 
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5) According to Mahapatra (2017), those who extended whole-hearted support for the project 
and submitted their land are living a more miserable life. “The government betrayed us. We 
surrendered all our resources to see the industry in our area and enjoy the benefits of 
industrialization. But the government couldn’t make it possible. Nor has it returned the land 
to us to continue our traditional economic activities like raising betel vines to make a 
survival.” said Tamil Pradhan, leader of people who supported the government. (cited from 
Mahapatra, 2017). The most pathetic story is of the people who sacrificed everything for 
POSCO and were kept by the government in the Transit Camp. “We were the first 
supporters of the project. But as POSCO decided to freeze the project, we suddenly became 
a burden on the government. The administration threatened to disconnect electricity and 
lock the houses unless we vacate the transit colony immediately and return home,” said 
Chandan Mohanty of Patana village, who was the president of the POSCO Transit Colony 
Association (cited from Mahapatra, 2017). 
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presently a lack of clear and unambiguous information about POSCO’s 
intentions in regards to the size of the steel plant, about which concerned 
people might make a complaint. This lack of information has become an 
even more serious barrier since 2012, when POSCO modified its proposed 
project by removing the privately owned land in Dhinkia and other villages 
from its land acquisition plan, and proposing a smaller plant” (Balaton - 
Chrimes 2015, 49). 
For the last twelve years, villagers of Jagatsinghpur District have been 
consistently protesting against the establishment of the steel and captive 
power plant by POSCO. In response to the villagers’ protests, the state 
government and administration, allegedly in collusion with POSCO sent 
police and paramilitary forces, which in some instances used excessive 
force against the resistors. The government has engaged in grave 
violations of laws, democratic processes and human rights, which include 
use of state force and intimidation to quell dissent against the POSCO 
project, setting up of barricades to prevent free movement, attempts of 
forced evictions, and account of loss of land, housing and livelihood. Local 
and global NGOs and media were concerned with the human rights 
violation cases and potential environmental destruction in the process of 
the project, and have recommended POSCO to consider human rights and 
environmental issues in the process. However, POSCO had not put much 
effort into solving economic, social, environmental issues and concerns in 
the Odisha steel plant project (Amnesty International 2011). The “moral 
damages” from the POSCO-India project are very real despite their 
intangible nature (Wong 2013). 
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Ⅵ. Land Acquisition and Compensation 
1. Changes of the Land Classification and Forest Right Act 2006
On June 2005, POSCO registered new company, “POSCO India Pvt. 
Ltd.”, under the Indian Companies Act 1956, asked Government to acquire 
the required land for their project at proposed site through IDCO. 
According to Mr. Binod Chandra Mishra, who were in charge of land 
acquisition at IDCO, at the time of finalizing the land details of all the 
villages that are to be acquired for the POSCO. The land details were 
finalized taking in to account 842.96 acres of forest land, 2723.60 non-forest 
government land and 437.68 of purely private agricultural land. Thus all 
total 4004.24 acres of the land was finally worked out to be required for the 
project (Mishra 2014, 5).  
The POSCO started initiating filing land acquisition for 437.68 acres of 
private land and submitted proposal to Collector for sanction of non-forest 
government land of 2723.90 acres. As per the Indian Law the forest land 
under Forest (Conservation) Act 1980 if any forest land is required for any 
purpose other than forest then a proposal is to be initiated for diverted of 
forest land following a set of principles, guidance with identification of equal 
extent of non-forest Government land to be used as compensatory land for 
forest. Hence POSCO initiated Forest Diversion Proposal of 842.96 acres 
(Mishra 2014, 10). 
When the proposal was on the table of Forest Officer, IDCO, he examined 
and found that the settlement operation was completed in 1985 and under 
the FC Act the status of land has to be examined as on 25th October 1980 
as a cut-off period defined by Supreme Court for understanding the status of 
Forest land. Since the Record of Rights was published in 1985, the forest 
The POSCO-India Project and the Land War in Odisha
312
officer asked to submit the status of said land as on October 1980. It was 
examined as previous reference in land record. It was found that non-forest 
government land that has been notified by settlement authorities in 1985 
was earlier in the status of forest land (Mishra 2014, 11). Thus the 
classification has been changed considering the forest land at pre-1980 
status as shown in the <Figure 4-1> and <Table 4-1>. As a result, the 
total forest land is converted to 3566.56 acres and the forest diversion 
proposal including compensatory land for afforestation is increased almost 
four fold from the initial proposal (Mishra 2014, 12). 
<Figure 4-1> POSCO-India site after inclusion of pre-1980 forest land
Source: Mishra (2014, 10).
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Source: Mishra (2014, 10). 
<Table 4-1> Land Classification under the forest land at pre-1980 status  
Name of village Govt. 
Forest land 
Non-Forest 
Govt. land 
Private land Total 
Govindapur 893.96 0 73.26 967.22
Dhinkia 934.53 0 284.97 1219.50
Polanga 328.41 0 53.85 382.26
Nuagaon 736.11 0 3.42 739.53
Bhuyanpal 49.56 0 2.02 51,58
Bayanalakandha 52.03 0 2.41 54.44
Noliasahi 52.67 0 17.75 70.42
Jatadhar 519.29 0 0 519.29
Total 3566.56 0 437.68 4004.24
Source: Mishra (2014, 12). 
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While clearances from State Government and State Pollution Control 
Board were received fairly early, on 19 November 2006 (for the captive 
port) and 12 June 2007 (for the steel plant), clearances from central 
regulation has not been smooth. It received Environment and Coastal 
Regulation Zone (CRZ) clearances from the Government of India in 2007 
but the clearance under the Forest (Conservation) Act from Government of 
India came late in December 2009 to be suspended since November 2010 
for non-compliance with the Forest Rights Act 2006 and again granted 
conditional clearance in February 2011.6) The Ministry of Environment and 
<Table 4-1> Land Classification under the forest land at pre-1980 status 
Name of village Govt. Forest land Non-Forest Govt. land Private land Total
Govindapur 893.96 0 73.26 967.22
Dhinkia 934.53 0 284.97 1219.50
Polanga 328.41 0 53.85 382.26
Nuagaon 736.11 0 3.42 739.53
Bhuyanpal 49.56 0 2.02 51,58
Bayanalakandha 52.03 0 2.41 54.44
Noliasahi 52.67 0 17.75 70.42
Jatadhar 519.29 0 0 519.29
Total 3566.56 0 437.68 4004.24
Source: Mishra (2014, 12).
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6) The conditional clearance that came in early 2011 has some 60 additional conditions on 
POSCO's steel plant and captive port project in Odisha. Environmental clearance for the 
steel-cum-captive power plant is being accorded with 28 additional conditions over and above 
stipulated in the original environmental clearance of July 19, 2007. The environmental 
clearance for captive port is being accorded with 32 additional conditions over and above 
stipulated in the original environmental clearance of May 15, 2007. The Environmental 
Minister has also sought categorical assurance from the state government that there is no 
violation of Forest Rights Act (FRA) in the land acquisition process. Odisha government's 
assurance that those claiming dependence on land in the project area were not categorized as 
“other traditional forest dwellers (OTFD)” under Forest Rights Act is necessary 
(Government of India, 2010,b; Park 2011).
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Forests of the Government of India, in response to the claims of N.C 
Saxena committee, issued a stop work order. The order directed that all 
land acquisition and transfer of land for POSCO India project, including 
handing over of the forest and non-forest land be stopped forthwith, and 
details submitted to the Ministry. The state government of Odisha and 
POSCO India respected the stop work order from the Central Government 
of India (Mishra 2014, 15). 
On 16 August, 2010, N.C. Saxena committee, was appointed to look into 
the forest clearance proposal for bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri hills of 
Odisha for the Vedanta aluminum project, gave its report (Government of 
India, 2010, a), categorically stating that the proposed mining lease in the 
area should be disallowed because it would deprive tribal people, 
particularly Primitive Tribal Groups (TPGs) of their forest rights and 
destroy their lives. The Ministry of Environment and Forests acting on this 
report disallowed the forest clearance, rendering the mine inoperable. 
Since POSCO, like Vedanta is a large mineral based company in the process 
of establishing a major project in Odisha, the two projects are often equated 
in the public mind. There was an immediate assumption, therefore, that the 
POSCO project, too, would be disallowed. The police firing and death of 
adivasis opposing the Tata Steel Plant at Kalinganagar in January 2006, and 
in Nandigram over forced acquisition of land by the state has played a major 
role in putting pressure on the BJD-led government to treat cautiously in 
the POSCO case (Park 2011).
2. Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the LARRA 2013
The genesis of land acquisition in India lies in the Bengal Regulation Act 
(I) of 1824, enacted to promote British commercial interests in the country. 
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 replaced all previous laws relating to land 
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acquisition. The end of colonial rule in 1947 and the Republican 
Constitution of 1950 did not bring about any significant change in the land 
acquisition law. Article 372 of the Constitution of India allowed all colonial 
laws to remain in force unless they were explicitly repealed (Ray and Patra 
2009, 43). 
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894–essentially a colonial measure intended 
to ensure a smooth acquisition of land for roads, railways, or irrigation 
works – empowered the state government to acquire land in any locality 
where such land is likely to be needed for any “public purpose” or for a 
“company”(Sarkar, P. 2007, 5). In the wake of the land acquisition in 
Singur, West Bengal, the act was criticized by social activities, 
commentators, and politicians on many counts: for being designed for 
subjecthood and not for citizenship (Sundar 2011,177); for the facilitating 
land transfers at a nominal rate of compensation and without rehabilitation; 
for not recognizing community rights over lands; and for not compensating 
those who tilled the land without having legal title (Guha 2007, 49-52, cited 
from Nielsen and Nielsen 2017, 135-6). 
The fact that the nature and functioning of the 1894 Land Acquisition Act 
had been subject to intense scrutiny and a long public debate that had 
involved dispossessed populations, activist groups, NGOs, advocacy 
networks, and political parties soon led to broad call to change the legal 
framework under which land acquisitions are carried out in India (Nielsen 
and Nielsen 2017, 137). In December 2007, the Land Acquisition 
(Amendment) Bill, 2007, was introduced in the Lok Sabha. It was later 
amended and rechristened the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2009, 
and was tabled in the Lok Sabha along with the Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation Bill in that year. While the Land Acquisition (Amendment) 
Bill could be seen to expand the scope for state intervention in land 
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transfers, the draft Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill contained 
progressive measures for the dispossessed and displaced. The bill 
recognized the rights of the landless and artisans to compensation, and not 
just the landowners. (Nielsen and Nielsen 2017, 137-8).
The fact that the draft bills were thus strong on rehabilitation but weak 
on limiting the exercise of eminent domain points to the contours of an 
emerging compromise equilibrium on land acquisitions in India under which 
state-led land transfers to private investors could continue and potentially 
even accelerate, albeit at a considerably higher cost(Nielsen and Nielsen 
2017, 138-9). However, the two bills lapsed with the expiry of the term of 
fourteenth Lok Sabha in 2009. After that, the idea of simply amending the 
existing act was abandoned and a complete rewriting of the law initiated 
(Ramesh and Khan 2015,11), eventually resulting in the Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011. This bill was redrafted between 
2011 to 2013 until it was, in its final version, the Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act (LARRA) 2013, passed by the Lok Sabha in August 2013. 
It came into effect on January 1, 2014 (Nielsen and Nielsen 2017, 138-9).
3. Views on Land and Role of the State in Land Acquisition
Ask a POSCO-India project promoter what was the single biggest 
constraint to speedy execution of the project and the answer will be “land”. 
“Indeed, an official review of projects that have been delayed indicates that 
70 percent of the 190 delayed projects are due to land acquisition problems. 
Land, which is limited in supply by its very nature, has been subject to 
rising and competing demands over the years” (Sarkar 2009, 1).
According to Ram and Kakani (2009, 91), “businesses perceiving land as 
a commodity to build private wealth and communities viewing it as an asset 
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that empowers and sustains livelihoods, is at the heart of opposition to land 
acquisition attempts by private business.” Almost of the people dependent 
on land in India do not have the skills to survive without land; nor are there 
enough job opportunities to absorb unskilled labor. So the transition to an 
industrial or service economy from an agrarian economy is not easy for 
most people. The people and communities who have lived on this land see it 
“as an invaluable good or priceless” (Sarkar 2009,1). 
In contrast, project promoters look at land as an “economic resource” 
needed for the development of the project. Hence, they associate it with an 
economic value and regard it as a commodity that can be bought and sold 
for a price. This is, in fact, one of the main reasons why there is growing 
social discontent relating to land acquisition. 
According to Sathe(2011), the role of the state in land acquisition in India 
can be divided into two phases. The first is the “traditional phase” starting 
from the First Five-Year Plan (1951-6) to the opening up of the economy in 
1991 through deregulation and liberalization. The second is the “civil 
society phase” characterized by increased activism and consciousness about 
the importance of land. In the post-Independence period, the first wave of 
the need to appropriately handle the social and economic effects of large-
scale use of land for non-agricultural purposes came with the 
commencement of the planning process. Development projects, mostly in 
the public sector, were commissioned, and the requirement for appropriate 
land arose in a big way (Sathe 2011,152-3). 
In the second phase, the policy climate of the Indian Government went 
through a paradigm shift in the early 1990s. Gradually, the political 
leadership loosened the controls of the licensing system. Private 
investment was welcomed in areas that previously been dominated by the 
public sector such as power, roads, bridges, airports, and setting up of 
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Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to boost FDI inflow.7) The government 
started acquiring large tracts of land on behalf of private companies 
categorizing nearly every private activity as “public purpose” to invoke the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (Ray and Patra 2009, 43).
What is going on in India today can be understood by employing the 
concept of “primitive accumulation” - separating primary producers from 
land, privatization of the public, conversion of common property resources 
into marketable commodities, destroying non-market ways of living, and so 
on (Das 2012). Scholars have interpreted the Indian government’s 
appropriation of land for SEZs and other development projects as an 
example of Marx’s “primitive accumulation of capital” (Basu 2007; D’Costa 
2011). While explaining “compressed capitalism” and development in India, 
D’Costa(2014, 331) states, “Large infrastructure projects involving 
expropriation of land or flooding of land due to dams are integral to 
primitive accumulation.”8) Once the path of development called 
7) Between independence in 1947 and economic liberalization in the early 1990s, India operated 
under a developmentalist regime of dispossession. Under this regime, the Indian state 
dispossessed land for state-led industrial and infrastructural projects, ensuring compliance 
through coercion and powerful ideological appeals to national development. This 
dispossession facil itated productive agrarian and industrial accumulation that 
disproportionately benefited the industrial bourgeoisie, big farmers, and the public sector 
elite, but also delivered some benefits to other classes. This development was, however, 
based on the impoverishment of tens of millions of people that it dispossessed. For many 
decades, this regime was able to convince a wide public that such dispossession constituted a 
necessary sacrifice for “the nation.” Social movements in the 1970s and 1980s challenged this 
view, but they could not substantially impede dispossession before the developmentalist 
regime gave way to economic liberalization. Economic liberalization in the early 1990s 
generated a transition to a new neoliberal regime of dispossession in which state governments 
restructured themselves as land brokers for private capital. No longer just dispossessing land 
for state-led industrial and infrastructural projects, states turned to dispossessing peasants 
for private real estate. SEZs are the archetype of this regime (Levine 2013: 1). 
8) Harvey also uses of “accumulation by dispossession,” to understand the expansion of global 
finance since the 1970s. He argues that, “capitalism always requires a fund of assets outside 
of itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of overaccumulation.” (Harvey 
2003,143).
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globalization has been chosen, forced eviction from the land was always on 
the cards (Basu 2007,1281). 
4. Land Acquisition and Compensation through the IRR Model
As shown in <Table 4-2>, a lot of industrial projects by private business 
are abandoned or tending toward failure. At the heart of the delay or failure 
is the issue of land. When the land-use pattern is transformed due to 
industry or infrastructure needs, these technical, social, and moral 
arrangements get displaced, thus affecting the communities associated with 
the land and making them vulnerable. 
Resettling and rehabilitating the affected communities by providing 
alternate arrangements that are equally effective to ensure economic and 
social security, becomes the moral obligation of the state. The state then 
holds the new owners of the land responsible for it through policies and 
legal instruments including infrastructure restoration, individual land 
compensation, and restoration of livelihood (Bapat 2009, 98). In this 
context, satisfactory compensation on the base of Cernea’s Impoverishment 
Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model for resettling displaced populations 
is required (Cernea, 2000). According to IRR model for resettling the 
displaced, displacement risks can be assessed by deconstructing the 
multifaceted process of displacement into its identifiable, principal, and 
most widespread, components; These are: a) landlessness; b) joblessness; 
c) homelessness; d) marginalization; e) food insecurity; f) increased 
morbidity; g) loss of access to common property resources; and h) social 
disarticulation. It suggests that preventing or overcoming the pattern of 
impoverishment would require risk reversal. This can be accomplished 
through targeted strategies, backed up by adequate financing. Turning the 
model on its head shows which strategies must be adopted and which 
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directions should be taken: a) from landlessness to land-based 
resettlement; b)from joblessness to reemployment; c) from homelessness 
to house reconstruction; d) from marginalization to social inclusion; e) from 
increased morbidity to improved health care; f) from food insecurity to 
adequate nutrition; g) from loss of access to restoration of community 
assets and services; and h) from social disarticulation to social 
cohesion(Cernea, 2000; cited from Park 2011). The IRR model has been 
used as a framework for a number of studies. According to Stanley(nd,13), 
“Aside from distinguishing risks, the IRR model serves several other 
functions: as a predictor of impoverishment; as a compass for risk reversal, 
advocating targeted resettlement policies, such as land-based (as opposed 
to mere cash-based) resettlement, job creation, health and nutritional 
safeguards, and social network rebuilding.” 
At this stage, the most important factor is trust. The message from 
troubled projects of POSCO is that no matter how generous the 
compensation, unless the Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) Policy is 
comprehensively communicated and credibility of its implementation firmly 
established. PAPs will always be reluctant to part with their land (Datta, et 
al. 2009, 118). Where transparent negotiations can take place, space for 
communication between the impacted communities and the project 
implementers could be established. Missing links between the PAPs and 
project promoters explains why despite the policies and legislations relating 
to R&R becoming increasingly sympathetic to the cause of the involuntarily 
displaced, the PAPs continue to feel insecure and resentful (Bapat 
2009,100). 
Kakani, et al.(2009) have suggested the process pattern of a successful 
strategy as follows; “In the first stage, the private business enters into a 
formal agreement with the appropriate state government. In the second 
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stage, the business directly initiates a dialogue with key local stakeholders. 
The state government plays a facilitator’s role, only to the extent needed. 
The bipartite discussions result in the private business appreciating the 
local issues and concerns and also signal the beginning of a long-term 
relationship between the community and private business. A few 
concessions and a conciliatory stance from both the parties result in the 
project going to stage three where in all the paperwork and clearances are 
<Table 4-2> Major Projects of Private Business along with the Status 
Project brief Sponsor name Place Status (2013)
Alumina Refinery Vedanta (Sterlite) Lanjigarh (Odisha) Successful
Aluminium Smelter Vedanta (Sterlite) Jharsuguda (Odisha) Successful
Car Plant Tata Motors Singur (West Bengal) Abandoned
Car Plant Hyundai Motors Irungattukottai (Tamil Nadu) Successful
Port and SEZ Adani Group Mundra (Gujarat) Successful
Power Plant Navin Jindal Group Raigarh(Chhattisgarh) Successful
Power Plant Sajjan Jindal Group Barmer (Rajasthan) Successful
Power Plant Moser Baer Chandil (Jharkhand) Successful
Power Plant, Fertilizer, Steel Tata Group Barapukuria (Bangladesh) Abandoned
SEZ Mahindra Group Bagru (Rajasthan) Successful
SEZ Mahindra Group Maraimalainagar (Tamil Nadu) Successful
Steel Plant Bhusan Steel Potka (Jharkhand) Stalemate
Steel Plant Tata Steel Bastar (Chhattisgarh) Stalemate
Steel Plant Tata Steel Gopalpur (Odisha) Abandoned
Steel Plant Essar Group Paradip (Odisha) Stalemate
Steel Plant POSCO, Korea Paradip(Odisha) Stalemate
Steel Plant L.N. Mittal Group Torpa (Jharkhand) Stalemate
Steel Plant L.N. Mittal Group Kasaphal (Odisha) Stalemate
Steel Plant Tata Steel Saraikela (Jharkhand) Stalemate
Steel Plant Sajjan Jindal Group Salboni (West Bengal) Successful
Steel Plant Tata Steel Kalinganagar (Odisha) Successful
Titanium Dioxide Tata Steel Tuticorin (Tamil Nadu) Abandoned
Source: Kakani, et al.(2009 ,136) updated with recent data by the author.
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obtained. This lays the foundation for stage four, where successful project 
implementation is achieved.”(Kakani, et al. 2009, 135-6). 
Ⅴ. Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the POSCO’s motivation of POSCO to expand in 
India and the origin of the anti-POSCO protests, and discuss over the land 
acquisition in “moral economy” terms. POSCO’s main objectives are to 
secure raw material and penetrate the Indian steel market. Locating a plant 
close to raw materials source is a cost -reducing strategy, especially when 
freight costs are on the rise. It is a representative type of resource seeking 
FDI (Bjorvatn et al. 2002). Business strategies of multinationals (MNCs) 
being met by local protests is not new. However, POSCO’s experience in 
Odisha in an era of globalization and India’s economic deregulation and 
liberalization suggests the unfamiliarity of MNCs with host country 
contexts. The conundrum faced by both governments and business is how 
to industrialize an impoverished region without destabilizing the region 
with large-scale displacement of people.
In general, industrialization entails transforming land from agricultural to 
industrial use and thus acquisition of land displaces the people. If not 
handled properly, social and political unrest is likely, which could gravely 
endanger the industrialization process itself (Sarkar, A. 2007). Ensuring 
economic development in a systematically neglected state like Odisha is a 
much more complex process than mega-industrial projects transforming the 
lot in a stroke (Das 2006). What is needed is sustainable development that 
would also eliminate and enable people to with dignity (Bhaduri 2005). 
However, development-induced displacement unleashes social, economic 
and environmental changes with the most visible risk being loss of land. 
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Other potential risks that deeply threaten the sustainability are joblessness, 
homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, loss of common lands and 
resources, increased health risks, and social disarticulation (Downing 
2002).
One way to minimize some of the ill effects of land acquisition is to apply 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) creatively (Bapat 2009:100-1). 
Adherence to social justice and equity norms and respect for civil rights and 
people’s entitlements should remain paramount (Cernea 2000). There is a 
growing awareness among extractive industry companies that it is 
important to engage and work directly with indigenous peoples and 
communities and to respond to local concerns and create opportunities that 
meet local aspirations, a concept that is integral to the industry’s 
elaboration of the concept of “social license.” (World Bank Group and 
Extractive Industries, vol.2, 2003, 47). POSCO should have followed this 
and be recognized as “extractive industries transparency initiative 
compliant.”(EITI).9) As a company engaged in the extractive and energy 
sectors, POSCO must have recognized the importance of the promotion and 
protection of human rights and it should be abided by the “voluntary 
principles on security and human right.”10) The three main enabling 
conditions for POSCO to adhere to these CSR practices are: 1) “pro-poor 
public and corporate governance, including proactive planning and 
management to maximize poverty alleviation through sustainable 
development; (2) much more effective social and environmental policies; 
and (3) respect for human rights”(World Bank Group and Extractive 
Industries 2003, vol.1, ⅶ).
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Even though the formal closure of POSCO-India project in Odisha is seen 
as a victory for the agrarian economy and the betel leaf farmers of 
Jagatsinghpur, but those who lost their land face new challenges. It’s only a 
lose-lose situation for the people who lost their land, livelihood sources and 
everything for POSCO. Even as the exit of POSCO from Odisha has thrown 
up questions about the use of the land acquired for the POSCO-India 
project, the intent of the state government for forward transfer to another 
industry is likely to face a fresh round of resistance from anti-POSCO group 
in the area (Mahapatra, 2017; Satapathy, 2017). The state government, 
which quickly moved to add this land to a “land bank” it has been building 
since 2007. The IDCO started to wall off the 1,700 hectares near Nuagaon 
in late May 2017. The wall will eventually fence off the nearby Dhinkia and 
Gobindpur villages too (Tripathi, 2017).
According to Paikray (2017), the government of Odisha is planning to 
hand over the land to JSW Steel Limited. In 2011, over 2,700 acres of land 
was forcefully acquired by the IDCO for the POSCO project. But unlike 
Singur, the 2,700 acres land acquired for the POSCO project wasn’t in the 
name of the villagers, who mostly encroached upon the government land to 
build their betel vines. The administration had paid them compensation for 
the assets to win their support for the land acquisition. With the project 
being a non-starter for long, after the completion of the land acquisition 
process in 2013, some villagers, who had pulled down their betel vines in 
lieu of compensation to make way for the POSCO project have started 
rebuilding their vines on the earmarked area. Almost of villagers who had 
received compensation already spending their money in last four years and 
unable to find alternate livelihood beyond betel leaf cultivation (Mahapatra, 
2017). According to Paikray (2017), nearly 300 betel vines have resurfaced 
in the acquired area close to Gobindpur and Polang villages and the process 
325
is on. The police have registered 32 cases against the encroachers and 
criminal cases have been registered against the occupiers under the Odisha 
Prevention of Land Encroachment (OPLE) Act. Mere registration of cases 
without any physical action to protect the POSCO site, however, has little 
effect on the new spate of encroachments on it. But going by past problems 
to clear the area for the POSCO project, the administration may be faced 
with a Herculean task to take possession of the acquired land. 
In retrospect, POSCO venture in India had brought out the diverse 
regional dynamics in India and the federated political system where Delhi 
does not determine the outcome. Rather, state governments and their 
ability to manage local political dynamics often determine the results. 
“Land war” in Odisha may not be stopped for the time being. People have 
rights and when the public is mobilized, especially when it comes to 
livelihoods of marginalized people, the government must respond. In fact 
this will be a continuing feature in developing countries where the pressure 
on land is high due to industrial and urban expansion. 
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